1. The place of Carpatho-Ruthenia in Hungarian irredentist plans.
1.1 The background of foreign policy. The motives behind domestic politics.
It is known that the restoration of the frontiers of 1918 and the
revision of the peace arrangements of 1920 were the pivot of Hungary’ s foreign and domestic policy. Among the reclaimed
territories Carpatho-Ruthenia had a peculiar place, as there not ethnical reasons
( majority and/or maltreatment of the Hungarian population ) but Hungarian demand for territories was "on the flag."
An Eucharist World Congress took place in Budapest in 1938. The Hungarian government and the Roman Catholic Church, with papal approval and in the name of St. Steven’ s imperial concept, proclaimed the reconquering of territories. At that time, in August, in spite of German demand, Hungary did not undertake armed intervention, referring to her military unpreparedness.
The Hungarian leadership wanted to win over the Slovak leader Tiso too, to support dismemberment of Czechoslovakia under Hungarian authority, but the Slovak Peoples Party ( Szlovák Néppárt ) planned an independent action.
The Polish government endorsed the establishing of a "north-east outlet, a horizontal axis" by way of occupying Carpatho-Ruthenia. As part of the preparation for the campaign, the Hungarian government set up a propaganda organ in the Bureau of the Prime Minister.1
Up to the autumn of 1938 the revisionist plans of the Hungarian government rested on a lot of illusions. It was merely a daydream that the country, following the pattern of 17th century principality in Transsylvania and with the help of a Polish-Hungarian corridor, could play some kind of a balancing role between the Russian and the German empires. The government underestimated the military strength of the Soviet Union; it presumed that Hungary can gain territories without taking part in the war; it was severely mistaken when it hoped that German orientation would not lead to the adoption of German internal policy models.2
Besides illusions it was clear, however, that the Hungarian plans can be realized only by an immediate joining German action aimed at the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. "Following the handing over of territories with Hungarian majority, the practical realization of the right of self-determination of other nationalities in Slovakia is still to come ( emphasis added - S. Á.). Without this the final reorganization of Czechoslovakia cannot be accomplished."3
From the autumn of 1938 onwards the prime ministers coming one after the other: Kálmán Darányi, Béla Imrédy, Pál Teleki exercised common tactics with slight differences. They attacked along three lines. Along the legal line: with arguments based on constitutional law, relying upon so-called historical rights, demanding autonomy and plebiscite. They demanded autonomy for Ruthenia which would have been followed by secession from Czechoslovakia. In order to change the proportion of Hungarian participation, they demanded the revision of data of the 1930 census in Czechoslovakia.
The other line was the organizing of forces within the area, able to force out secession with means of internal policy. The Hungarian government supported or rather brought to existence a pro-German tendency in the Ukraine and a Russian one too. A part of these steps was supported by the Polish government too.4
The stake along the third line was a direct armed intervention. Besides a few Ukrainian diversionary actions, the "free companies of volunteers" organized in Hungary constituted the main force. From October 1938 onward these companies were commanded by a Government Chief Commissioner attached to the General Staff. He was assisted by the concerted work of a number of departments. One, for example, under the supervision of the Prime Minister, was the "Upper Northern Hungary Unification Group" explicitly established "to prepare unification." ( Later on, this group became the kernel of the Ministry for Upper Northern Hungary. ) The head of these measures was count Miklós Kozma, Interior Minister of the ill-famed Gömbös government. Their direct inrush, however, failed within a short time, because of opposition from the side of German foreign-and military policy, as well as Carpatho-Ruthenian internal opposition.5
The Vienna decision of November 2, 1938, allocated on ethnical ground into Hungarian possession merely the southern edge of Carpatho-Ruthenia. Besides the continuation of former methods, the main emphasis shifted: The price of revision was fixed unequivocally and - as we shall see later - very highly by the German side. It decided the date too.
Hitler stipulated on September 21, 1938 already: Germany is ready to support Hungarian interests only in case of active anti-Czech steps by Hungary; no guarantees should be given as regards Czech boarders; the Hungarian side organize "free companies" and demand plebiscite; it is expected to co-operate with Sudeten Germans and to give special rights to Germans in Hungary. On October 14 Hitler added: "In any case, the decisive factor is not who is right but who has might."6
The German negotiators, obviously with regard to war plans, rejected any pro-Polish intention of the Hungarians, but supported the operation of an Ukrainian government or any other body which can be mobilized against the Soviet Union, - including incursions into Poland. Demand: "Hungary give up the principle of Polish-Hungarian alliance in case it would hamper a German decision."7/a
In the course of January-February 1939, the German demands were expounded point by point: Hungary quit the League of Nations, hand over to the Germans without restriction the results of the Hungarian intelligence service7/b and establish "still closer economic links."
The Germans prescribed that a long-term agreement laying down that deliveries will take place at fixed prices, should regulate the framework of economic relations. The secret agreements concluded earlier remained in force too. Exports to Germany should reach 48 per cent of total exports.7/c The export of the following items must increase: wheat, hemp, linen, wool, soybeans, alfalfa, cattle, swine, - agricultural produce and animal products in general. The German side prescribed how radically and within what time limit should Hungarian industrialization decrease. With a direct regard to Carpatho-Ruthenia, the Hungarian government undertook that "from the point of view of traffic technology, German wishes regarding road construction could fully be taken into consideration."7/d
All kinds of claims included the demand "to decrease the economic influence of Jews, to expropriate their assets and to expel them." ( Later, in June 1940, Hitler presented his demands in a comprehensive package for the increase of Hungarian exports of foodstuff, for the guaranteeing the transit of German troops. He presented his instructions, too, to eliminate the Jews for the sake of acquiring economic resources. )8
1.2 Timetable of the occupation.
The first open action towards occupation was launched by Kálmán Darányi after the Anschluss. The next prime minister broke off talks with the Czechoslovak government about the situation of Hungarian minorities. By doing so, he kept his earlier promise that "Hungary will find an excuse in order to be exempted from the renouncement of the use of force."9
Second phase: Prime Minister Imrédy announces in Kaposvár: The burdens of territorial enlargement and the solving of social problems will be shifted onto the Jews. ( That is, expenses will be covered from their assets. ) On October 17, 1938, the Hungarian government in the question of Upper Northern Hungary and Carpatho-Ruthenia requested - instead of an international conference - a German-Italian arbitration as well as pressure on Yugoslavia to remain neutral in case of an action in Czechoslovakia. As a reciprocation, it undertook the enactment of a law on the special legal status of Volksbund, a German national minority group. ( This was carried through on April 13, 1939. )10
On October 29, 1938, after a series of rejections, the German Foreign Ministry agreed with the reannexation to Hungary of Kassa and Munkács, with an area of 11,927 km2. This area, however, touched the very western edge of Carpatho-Ruthenia only.
The "marching-in" took place on March 18, 1939. Two questions arise immediately: The first: Why was it that in spite of German demands and Hungarian traditional anti-Semitism the Jewish question did not get into the forefront in connection with Carpatho-Ruthenia, though every 6th inhabitant was a Jew? And in case this question got to the forefront somewhere, this happened only at closed government party meetings. While high-sounding symbols in connection with Carpatho-Ruthenia - historical imperial interests and Hungarian cultural superiority - were affirmed repeatedly, neither the aim nor the means of acquiring territories were outlined.
This is the point where we get to the real aim of Prime Minister Pál Teleki, sticking strongly to the first anti-Jewish law of 1920. We try to analyse - the first time in Hungarian historiography- the strange turns of the Jewish question in Carpatho-Ruthenia. We are going to reveal the scientific and administrative manoeuvres of the Hungarian government: How did the government - first - utilize the presence and activities of the Jews in the interest of legalizing the conquest of territories, and - second - how did it exploit their annihilation for a direct and immediate "changing of the guard", to the benefit of the rootless Hungarian rule.
Slowly and gradually strategy and tactics reveal themselves with aggressive and rapid magyarization ( hungarianization ) in its axis, to the detriment of all nationalities. In what way did the plundering of defenceless nationalities serve the partial covering of war expenditure and the procrastination and tranquillisation of a social explosion threatening stability.11
Each confidential document reckons with the fact that Hungarians constitute less than half of the population of occupied Carpatho-Ruthenia. The aim, at the same time was an aggressive magyarization, the early lifting into the ruling elite of groups, - pillars of foreign and more and more fascistic internal policy. "magyarization" really meant that the integrated groups received estates and enterprises, it also meant the creation of state- and army posts for them, the occupation of cultural and local administrative bodies. Looking back upon this period even the bloody-handed Miklós Kozma is of the opinion that a definitely tangible tendency from Budapest and the country has to be mentioned: this tendency endeavours to magyarize quickly, almost provocatively.12
The government used a large staff to "ideologize" its aim and have it accepted, first of all, internationally. Far from completeness I refer to the Revisionist League - with bureaues in some European countries too; the Department for Nationalities in the Prime Minister’ s Office. In each and every ministry a group was set up to organize studies on Carpatho-Ruthenia. The main depositories were the "objective" Central Statistical Office and the "scientific" Institutes for Sociography and Political Sciences respectively.13
The area of 12,631 km2 embraced 36 villages. Between the Trianon decision of 1920 and 1938 this area, its administrative set-up and status were changed repeatedly by international treaties. Statistical categories also changed according to interests concerning possession policy and ethnical statistics. They introduced, for example, the category of "Czechoslovak nationality"; they gave Ruthenian names to settlements. ( That’ s why it is necessary, when evaluating documents, to identify the Hungarian place-names of 1913, the Ruthenian place-names of 1927, the Russian place-names of 1945 and the Ukrainian ones of 1992. )
1.3. The "scientific" falsification of statistics.
We collate the overall number of the population according to censuses of 1880, 1910, 1921, 1930, 1941. The number of the population increased between 1880 and 1940 more than twofold, from 401,280 to 850,589. As a consequence of frequent administrative reorganizations, a 1-1.5 per cent difference can be found as to the number of the population. The radically changing ethnical proportions are remarkable too, which cannot be explained by natural mobility. While the number of the population increased between 1910 and 1941 by 16 per cent, the ratio of Hungarians hardly changed, as a matter of fact decreased somewhat ( 33.66 per cent in 1910, 27.41 per cent in 1941. ) The proportion of Germans dropped from 11.54 per cent to 1. 55 per cent. The decisive majority was all the time the Russian: 55.54-58.81 per cent. The Russian and the Romanian ethnic groups were doubled in number. And all this happened in spite of the massive emigration following the turn of the century, the building out of the Hungarian administrative system during the Monarchy, the settling of Czech civil servants after 1920, the deliberate silencing of the German minority and the relatively high birth-rate of the Ruthenians.
It is only the increase and the decrease of the number of Jews, the appearance and disappearance of the category: "Jew", indeed of the word itself which rouses special attention: There is no "Jew" in the 1910 census. Statistics according to religion in Carpatho- Ukraine are scanty anyhow. Jews appear on the pages of official registries only in 1921 and 1930, at the time of the Czechoslovak Republic. Their ratio was 13.08 per cent in 1921 and 12.51 per cent in 1930. There are no Jews in the Hungarian statistics of 1941. The Central Statistical Office ( Központi Statisztikai Hivatal - KSH 1996. ) in its publication of 1996 ( Kárpátalja településeinek nemzetségi-anyanyelvi adatai 1880-1941 - Data per nationality/ mother tongue of the settlements in Carpatho-Ruthenia 1880-1941 ) issued figures differing from the aforesaid: 15.38 per cent in 1921 - 2 per cent more than reality - and 15.44 per cent ( 131,217 persons ) in 1930, 3 per cent more than the data in Czechoslovak statistics. The publication lacks explanation. By 1941, however, the category "Jew" disappeared from the Hungarian census, just at the time when anti-Jewish laws applied even to babies. Without registration a Jew could not have been enrolled in a school; A person registered as a Jew was not permitted to open a bank account. At the same time the introductory study of this KSH publication states on page 15 of its chapter "Methodological Notes" that "in 1941 the number and rate of Yiddish-speaking persons approached the number and proportion of Jews in 1930." It indicates 9.25 per cent ( 78,671 persons ) as the ratio in 1930. This is half of the real ratio; appr. 70,000 persons less than the appr. 148,000 calculated by me at first hand as the number of Jews in 1930.
On page 17 a separate summary deals with the ethnic composition of three towns -administrative and economic centers - of Carpatho-Ruthenia: Beregszász ( 13,846 inhabitants in 1921 and 19,007 in 1931 ), Munkács ( 20,865 inhabitants in 1921 and 26,102 in 1931 ) and Ungvár ( 20,601 inhabitants in 1921 and 26,675 in 1931. ) It is characteristic of the role of Jews in enlightenment and the building of a civic life that as regards the population of towns in the mainstream of development in the area, 18.74 per cent were Jews in 1921 and 20.17 per cent in 1930. This means that the proportion of Jews in towns was 5 per cent - later on 8 per cent - higher than in other settlements of Carpatho-Ruthenia. This social role of the Jews, however, disappeared in the manipulated statistics.
The first step of magyarization is statistical fraud. I took the following data from the already mentioned KSH 1996 publication and guide prepared by Magyar Királyi KSH ( Royal Hungarian Central Statistical Office ) in Hungarian and Russian for the Soviet Army, under the title "Magyarország helységnévtára - 1944" ( Gazetteer of Hungary-1944 ). In addition, I processed thoroughly the only available copy of Alajos Dolányi Kovács’ ( ill-famed author of "Jewish statistics" ) work "Magyarság Életereje" ( The Vitality of Hungarians ) ordered explicitly for statistical manoeuvres. The subtitle of the work: "A magyar statisztika módszere és rendszeressége" - Method and system of Hungarian Statistics. Compiled by Államtudományi Intézet - Institute for Political Sciences upon order of KSH in 1941.14
The fate of statistics is illuminative. Carpatho-Ruthenia was named Podkarpatska Rus; this served the interests of "Czechoslovakianization" in the 20-ies and 30-ies. New terminologies were introduced. By doing so, the Czechoslovak state founded in 1920 was displayed already from 1921 onward as an organic product of population development. Besides the original Slovak inhabitants, Czechs having arrived into economic or administrative positions were also listed in the category of "Czechoslovak" nationality. With this single step their proportion was increased by 34 per cent at a stroke. The ratio of the new category was increased further by the fact that between 1880 and 1930 the number of Slovaks grew five fold, while that of the overall population two fold.15 The tendency was strengthened by the government decrees of 1924 and 1927 about the Commission on the Revision of Place-Names of settlements according to Czech spelling. ( Little Russian - Ruthenian - names could also have been used. ) KSH publications of 1944 and 1996 indicate these names. The recognition of Little Russians ( Ruthenian ) as an independent nationality would also have decreased the possibility of proving Czechoslovak hegemony through figures. Therefore, various Slav ethnic groups were put into a compound category: "Russian."
The motive behind the handling of German category is also interesting. The rate of increase between 1880 and 1930 was 200 per cent. At the turn of the century they were the carriers of industrialization and urbanization. They moved here from other parts of the Monarchy. Later on, however, simply the parlance was transformed into a category of nationality.
In this situation it was in the interest of the Czechoslovak government to introduce a "Jew" category. By declaring as a nationality orthodox Jewish communities usually living in one block, it decreased the ratio of Hungarian and German categories and demonstrated the pluralism of the new state. The Hungarian statistical manoeuvre of 1941 rested upon two pillars: First: the fifty-year-long continuity between 1880 and 1941. The starting point was that "with us the ascertainment of nationality has taken place on the basis of mother tongue", although he knows that "one part of groups ( nationalities, employees in various branches of profession -S.Á. ) in the process of assimilation declares its mother tongue differently than the other, when it comes to a census."16
It should be considered that in this part of the Monarchy Hungarian was obligatorily the language of economics and public administration; the condition of attaining any public job was the knowledge of the Hungarian language; as regards those speaking more languages the knowledge of Hungarian was ranged with the category of nationality affiliation or assimilated stratum at least. The knowledge of Hungarian among the non-Hungarian speaking persons grew from 19.6 per cent to 29.3 per cent between 1880 and 1910! The number of those speaking only Hungarian increased from 46.7 per cent to 57.3 per cent. Hungarian was the language of modernization, - in industry and higher education alike. In the industrial sphere 65.6 per cent of the population spoke Hungarian, and 47.7 per cent of the agricultural population,- while in the municipal boroughs the proportion of Hungarians was only 16.5 per cent and a mere 9.7 per cent in smaller towns.17 According to this, the multiplication of Hungarians together with internal mobility and forced magyarization was 55 per cent ( 31 per cent of the Ruthenians ) between 1880 and 1910 that is in the course of three decades and 23.7 per cent in the course of five decades. The number of Slovaks - 2 per cent in 1880 - dropped to one half.
The other pillar was the changing of assimilation trends into statistical figures. " In historic ( pre-Trianon, S. Á. ) Hungary the linguistic "magyarization" of the Jewry ... was faster than that of any other religious denomination. The proportion of Jews of Hungarian mother tongue was higher at the time of each census than that of the Christian population all together" - points out Dolányi with statistical data.
The number of Germans dropped considerably, in favour of the Hungarians, mainly in industry and the towns. According to contemporary sociologists, the "magyarization" of the Jews played an important role in this. Following Hitler’s coming to power, "magyarization" got a political weight, too. Native Jews, and those coming from abroad, declared themselves Hungarian. From 1880 on persecuted Jews immigrated in large numbers into Carpatho-Ruthenia from Galicia, as well as craftsmen and skilled workers from the Austrian provinces.
How do data on the Jewish population of Carpatho-Ruthenia fit into the overall Hungarian picture?
My estimates are based on Czechoslovak and Hungarian statistics, as well as on the retrospective Hungarian statistics of 1996. The Hungarian statistics of 1941, compiled for the public, indicated that the number of Jews was 78,699, that is 9.25 per cent of the population. I mean only those were regarded Jew - for statistical purposes - who declared themselves of Yiddish mother tongue. In reality, the Jewry, numbered 91,845, - 12.25 per cent of the population. ( Moreover, if we add the "citizen of other country" category too, the numbers amount to 108,583 and 14,8 per cent. ) In the towns of Munkács, Ungvár and Beregszász - economic and administrative centers - more than 20 per cent of the inhabitants were Jews and 16 per cent were Hungarians.
The Jews of Carpatho-Ruthenia got magyarized in a little over half a century - and, moreover, voluntarily. They took refuge here from Russian pogroms, at the time of one of the best emancipation laws in Europe -for the sake of the freedom of religion and following the attainment of the right to settle down and practice a trade in Hungary. From Carpatho-Ruthenia they moved generally southward, to the agricultural regions along the Tisza river. In 1930, 44,840 Jews lived on the right bank of the Tisza and 47,005 on the left bank, altogether 91,845. The use of the Hungarian language, state birth registration and partly education in Hungarian were the first grade of rising out of the ghetto and a life resembling a ghetto. A reform-trend appeared in religion which conducted church services in Hungarian too.
Solidarity with the young modern Hungarian state sparked off "magyarization" en masse among citizens of nationality origin. A long line of social censuses is a witness to this. This applies to a greater extent to Jews who did not arrive from parent state, did not live in Diaspora but were looking for a final home for themselves and their families. Each of them decided individually about his destiny. Besides becoming Hungarian voluntarily, the magyarization of surnames and baptism to Christian faith also took place in the magnitude of tens of thousands. The performance of Jewish families playing an important role in industrial revolution and urbanization, was appreciated and regarded as a national merit by the state too. It is quite natural that Jews active in heavy industry, finances, trade, health care and jurisdiction declared themselves Hungarian en masse, especially as regards city dwellers. The proportion of "Hungarians" among the Jews, for example, increased from 58.5 per cent to 76.9 per cent between 1880 and 1910. ( Dolányi Kovács adds on page 58 of his study as a reason for assimilation that their aspiration for education and their gift for languages promoted this trend.) Let me recall, as an illustrative example, the memory of Jewry living mainly in villages or in towns but dealing there, too, with the processing and marketing of agricultural produce. The largest number of Jewish communities lived in Bereg, Ung , Ugocsa, and Máramarossziget administrative districts. This region embraced 501 small towns, large and small villages and 6 neighbouring settlements of 113 notarial zones of 14 district. The most numerous communities were Munkács - 41.66 per cent, and Máramaros county - 18.4 per cent. ( Detailed data in individual villages are also available for further study. )20
The following conclusions can be drown from the aforesaid: The Czechoslovak census of 1930 is the starting point. According to it 12.25% ( 91,845 persons ) of the total population of 734,315 were Jews. It has to be noted that the interest of the Czechoslovak authorities required the increasing of the number of "Czechoslovak" citizens. Nobody knows, how many Jews declared themselves of "Czechoslovak nationality", - under various influences. (We disregard the category "others", which also covered belonging to some nationality.) 16,658 persons registered themselves in the "citizen of other countries" category. The vast majority of them were also Jews. Thus, the 12.25 per cent has to be raised to 14.8 per cent from the outset. That is, the number of Jews in Carpatho-Ruthenia should be put to minimum 108,583, even on the basis of the Czechoslovak statistics. This is supported by the fact that some experts estimate the ratio of Jews at 15 per cent at least.
It is even more striking that Randolph L. Braham on the same page of his work "The Policy of Genocide" once puts the number of Jews in Carpatho-Ruthenia to 78,087 and a few lines later to 146,380. At the same time he indicated the total population of Carpatho-Ruthenia as 700,000. According to his train of thoughts 21 per cent of the population of Carpatho-Ruthenia were Jews.
It seems to be reasonable to apply the ratio indicated in the Czechoslovak statistics of 1930, when we analyse the figures in the Hungarian statistics of 1941. In the latter - in order to raise the number of "Hungarians" as high as possible - the categories of nationalities were discontinued. There was neither "Jew" nor "other" category. The Jew of Hungarian mother tongue or declaring himself as such, was registered as Hungarian. Only 9.25 per cent ( 78,699 persons of Yiddish mother tongue ) of the total population of 850,589 were regarded as Jews. MacCartney, relying on data in the Hungarian Statistical Review in 1941, quotes this figure of 78,000. Furthermore, he antedates this figure to 1930 and refers it not only to Carpatho-Ruthenia but to the re-annexed parts of Northern Hungary, too. Thus he concludes that the proportion of Jews on the mentioned territories was hardly more than 7 per cent. This is in contradiction to both the Czechoslovak census in 1930 and the Hungarian one in 1941. Regrettably, the Enzyklopädie des Holocaust ( III. volume ) also accepts this when it puts the total population of Carpatho-Ruthenia to an inexplicable low 500,000 and the ratio of Jews to 15 per cent. Thus it suggests that the number of Carpatho-Ruthenian Jews was about 78,000. This - I repeat - is unacceptable. Even if we accept the 12.25 per cent ratio of 1930 as a basis, the number of Carpatho-Ruthenian Jews has to be appr. 104-105,000 in 1941. This, too, is 30 per cent more than the figure 78,000 mentioned before. 15.93 per cent ( 116,975 persons ) of the population were Hungarians in 1930, but already 27.41 per cent ( 233,111 persons ) in 1941. It is obvious that the number of Hungarians could not have been doubled in 10 years, not even by the "help" of Czechoslovak and Hungarian statistical manipulations. The number of Jews declaring themselves Hungarian contributed considerably to this statistical increase. Taking all this into consideration, we can count 14.8 per cent - that is 125-126,000 people - of the total population of 850,589 in Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1941.
Apart from official announcements, there is the third - secret but reliable - statistical analysis, too. This pointed out exactly that on the territory of historical ( pre-Trianon ) Hungary 76.9 per cent of the Jews declared themselves of Hungarian mother tongue in 1910 already. If we take this into consideration and enter into a very cautious estimation, we can state that at least 50 per cent of the Carpatho-Ruthenian Jews declared themselves of Hungarian mother tongue at the time of the Hungarian census. This, on the other hand, means that the 50 per cent declaring themselves of Hungarian mother tongue equal to a further 79,000 persons. Thus, there had to be appr. 158-160,000 Jews in Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1941. This was 18.8 per cent of the total population.
I emphasize that my above calculations are based on published or secret, nonetheless official Hungarian data. There is no answer to the question: Are the thousands of citizens of other countries, living in Carpatho-Ruthenia, included? Do these figures include thousands of people who originally were from regions outside Carpatho-Ruthenia but were staying there incidentally at that time? To prove that my calculations rest on very cautious estimates, I refer to Veesenmayer’s report quoted in the war-crimes trial against Horst Wagner in 1961. ( Horst Wagner had been the head of Inland II. department of the German Foreign Ministry. ) Veesenmayer reported on April 28, 1944, about the concentration of 202,142 Carpatho-Ruthenian Jews and 25,000 Jewish forced labourers in the operational zone. In any case, the number of Jews in Carpatho-Ruthenia can be set at approximately 180,000 in January, 1941, when the statistics were taken. This means that besides the martyrs registered in the statistics, we have to recall the memory of a further 100,000 persons.
As regards the basic point and the order of magnitude, I see my counting confirmed by Y. Arad’s evaluation from 1992. He estimates that the number of Jews in Carpatho-Ruthenia was 140,000, that is, nearly the double of what had been published in Hungarian statistics in 1941.
1Tilkovszky, Lóránt: Revízió és nemzetiségpolitika Magyarországon - Revision and the policy of nationalities in Hungary - ( 1938-1944 ) Budapest 1967 ( hereafter: Tilkovszky ) pp. 23-24
2Concerning internal policy, see: Bethlen, István: Anschluss után - After the Anschluss, Pesti Napló 1938. IV. 17. Szegedy-Maszák, Aladár: Az ember osszel visszanéz. Egy volt magyar diplomata emlékirataiból. - One looks back in the fall. Memoirs of a former Hungarian diplomat. Budapest 1967. ( Hereafter Szegedy-Maszák ) pp. 233-259
3Akten zur Deutschen Auswä rtigen Politik 1918-1945 DIMK II.549-549/a.
4Tilkovszky: Az autonómia kérdésének szerepe a Kárpátukrajna birtokbavételét célzó magyar reviziós törekvésekben - The role of autonomy in Hungarian efforts aimed at the taking over of Carpatho-Ruthenia, pp. 145-161.
5"A ruszinkói kérdés" Magyar Országos Levéltár ( a továbbiakban MOL ) Kozma-iratok 27. csomó - "The Ruthenian question" Hungarian National Archives ( hereafter MOL ) Kozma-papers 27. bundle
6Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország. Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról - Wilhelmstrasse and Hungary. German diplomatic documents on Hungary. The introductory study written by Ránki, Pamlényi, Tilkovszky, Juhász. Budapest 1968. Compiled by DIMK II. Wilhelmstrasse pp. 297-9, 304. ( Hereafter: Wilhelmstrasse )
7/a,b,c,dIn order of enumeration see Wilhemstrasse pp. 357, 330, 340, 359, 360-363, 338, 367.
8Hitler’ s 68 negotiations with East-European statesmen 1939-1944. Tények és Tanuk - Facts and Witnesses, Edited by Ránki, György Budapest 1983. Negotiations on June 28, 1940.
9Ribentrop’ s talks with Hungarian foreign minister Kánya. August 25, 1938, Wilhelmstrasse p. 298.
10Dr. Heidlein, Johann: A magyarországi németség küzdelme fennmaradásért. Dokumentáció 1930-1950 - The struggle of German nationality in Hungary for its survival. A Documentation 1930-1950, Heidelberg 1996. pp. 218-222.
11Summary of secret Hungarian plans, see: Ruténföld elfoglalásának elozményei - The antecedents of the occupation of Ruthenia, MOL KÜM Sajtó 112. csomó ( bundle ) 42718.
12Kozma’ s letter, dated in Ungvár on September 22, 1941, to Prime Minister Bárdossy, MOL Kozma iratok - Kozma documents, 31 cs. ( bundle ) without number.
13Aldobolyi Nagy, Miklós : Census. Magyar Szemle 1940. II. pp. 341-345.
14MOL XIX.-J-l-a 9. doboz II.11. The intention was to use the manuscript - under another title- at the 1947 peace talks but this plan was dropped because of the tendentious content.
15Kárpátalja településeinek nemzetiségi (anyanyelvi) adatai (1880-1941) - Nationality ( mother tongue) data of the settlements in Carpatho-Ruthenia (1880-1941) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 1996 - Central Statistical Office 1996 ( Hereafter: KSH 96 ) pp. 41-44.
16Dolányi Kovács, Alajos: A magyarság életereje. A nemzetiségi statisztika módszere és helyessége - The vitality of Hungarians. The method and correctness of Hungarian statistics on nationalities. MOL XIX-J-l-a 9. doboz (d)II. 10-12. Study in 8 chapters pp. 200. ( Hereafter: Életero ) pp. 1. and 3.
17Figures in the course of succession: Életero pp. 5-6, 58, 69, 14-18, 39-40.
18Életerő pp. 47, 48, 69.
19Consecutively: KSH 96 33, 45, 51.
20In a publication "Magyarország helységnévtára - The Gazetteer of Hungary", prepared for the entry of the Soviet army, the "Magyar Királyi Központi Statisztikai Hivatal - The Royal Hungarian Central Statistical Office" indicates or differentiates respectively the places where inhabitants of Jewish religion or using the Yiddish language lived. In 1944, immediately after the entry of the Soviet army, a directory with Hungarian and Cyrillic letters was prepared "A 10,000 lakosnál nagyobb, idegen fennhatóság alá került magyar helységekrol - About Hungarian localities with a population of 10,000 or above, which got under foreign domination."
21Data published in Randolph L. Braham’ s book "A népirtás politikája - The politics of Genocide" pp. 143-144. are unpunctual concerning both the population of Carpatho-Ruthenia and the number of Jews, as he ignores Czechoslovak and Hungarian statistics and does not apply mobility indicators.